Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, C. Christine Fair, Brian A. Jackson, Brian Michael Jenkins, Seth G. Jones, Nathaniel Shestak, Ashley J. Tellis
This study of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008 is part of the RAND Corporation Occasional Papers series. The research for this report was completed in December 2008 and updated as of January 9, 2009.
We were pleased to meet one of the authors of this report, Robert D. Blackwill, past Ambassador of the US in India, in May 2009 and learn the following.
This report has been sponsored by Goldman Sachs & The Aspen Institute India. Rand Corporation is not a political organization.
Some of the findings
- The scope of the attacks on Mumbai on 26/11 was ambitious, audacious and complex
- It was a slow motion shootout & as such a classic firearms assault
- The Indian Govt. cannot protect its citizens and nowhere can we be safe
- The attacks had 3 parts- planning, reconnaissance and implementation
- Characterized by surprise, confusion and being overwhelming
- AK 56, being the Chinese version of the AK 47 were used
- Heckler & Koch hand guns were used
- The attacks were sequential and mobile
- All four teams successfully carried out their mission
- There was a lack of co-ordination between RAW & the IB
- Large gaps in coastal surveillance
- The Indian side (police, NSG, army etc.) were short of weapons and equipment
- E.g. the bullet proof vests were inadequate and so were the helmets
- The Police Cordon failed
- Implementation is the last act of policy - this is an essential truth
Some of the Implications & needs going forward
- India will continue to remain a target
- The feeble Indian response leads terrorists to believe that they can do it again
- The Police competency, skill and equipment levels need to be raised
- The coastal security needs to be hardened
- US policy towards Pakistan has failed
- There will be similar attacks in future but will appear different
- Terrorists will continue to innovate
Click here for the detailed report.
